An Artist\u27s Privilege by Schaumann, Niels
California Western School of Law 
CWSL Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Scholarship 
1997 
An Artist's Privilege 
Niels Schaumann 
California Western School of Law, nschaumann@cwsl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/fs 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
15 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 249-280 (1997) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu. 
? ???? ?????
Citation: 15 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.  249 1997 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Tue Aug 26 17:44:44 2014
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0736-7694
AN ARTIST'S PRIVILEGE
NIELS B. ScHAumANN*
INTRODUCTION ............................................... 249
A . Prologue ........................................... 249
1. Case O ne .................................... 251
2. Case Two ..................................... 251
B. Aesthetic Vocabulay ................................ 252
C. Copyright vs. Art ................................... 255
I. THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT ............. 256
A. Copyright, Authorship and Originality ............... 256
B. The Nature of Copyright ............................ 258
C. The Purpose of Copyright ........................... 260
D. Exceptions to Authorial Exclusivity .................. 262
1. Fair U se ...................................... 265
2. Compulsory Licensing ........................ 267
3. Hybrid Regulation ........................... 268
II. COPYRIGHT OR ART? .................................. 269
A. Copyright and the Suppression of Art ................ 270
B. Solutions from Within the Copyright Paradigm ........ 271
1. Fair U se ...................................... 271
2. Compulsory Licensing ........................ 273
3. Abandoning Copyright ....................... 274
III. A PROPOSAL .......................................... 274
A. Description ........................................ 275
B . Policy ............................................. 278
C. Technical Issues .................................... 279
CONCLUSION ................................................. 280
INTRODUCTION
A. Prologue
American culture in this last decade of the second millennium
is defined by mass media.' Some find this to be aesthetically or
Copyright © 1997 Niels B. Schaumann
* Professor, William Mitchell College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the
research assistance of Ann Dunn, Tami Schroeder, and Kristine Boylan. Thanks are due
also to Professor R. Carl Moy, who reviewed an earlier manuscript of this article, and to
Dean Harry Haynsworth and Associate Dean J. David Prince, whose support made this
article possible. Any errors are, of course, the sole responsibility of the author.
1 SeeJohn Carlin, Culture Vultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law, 13
COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTrs 103, 103-04 (1988). In addition to the media influences of which
we are conscious, many others remain largely unnoticed. So while we are aware of advertis-
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politically troubling,2 but there is a less visible, yet equally impor-
tant, aspect of media saturation. Almost without our noticing,
American culture has become private property, belonging to those
generating the media tide.
The trend toward private ownership of culture has not gone
entirely unremarked: artists address the questions raised by propri-
etary mass culture. Too often, however, they discover that to do so
"can make it rain lawyers."' The resulting litigation effectively
stifles their art, and through the publicity generated and dissemi-
nated by the media, inhibits others from similar commentary. It is
sadly ironic that copyright-a branch of the law intended to en-
hance public access to works of authorship-is the principal
weapon used against artists by their cultural landlords.4
This Article examines visual art in light of the letter and the
spirit of the Constitution's Copyright Clause5 and the Copyright
Act of 1976 ("Act")6 and concludes that artists should have the
ing slogans on television and in newspapers (which, despite our awareness, embed them-
selves in our minds), we also take in images and statements influencing our ideals of
beauty, ethics, and other cultural values. Escape from the media onslaught is almost im-
possible. As Mark Hosler, a member of the experimental musical group "Negativland,"
once put it in a conversation with The Edge (guitarist for the pop music group "U2"): "U2
is part of the media environment we live in, you know[.] I hear your songs playing in the
shopping mall in the background when I'm shopping, whether I want to or not." NEGATIV-
LAND, FAIR USE: THE STORY OF THE LETTER U AND THE NUMERAL 2 87 (1995).
Even more than popular music, television shapes American culture. On average, teen-
agers watch approximately twenty hours of television per week, or nearly three hours per
day. Adults have similar habits; the average adult views 15 to 18 hours per week of televi-
sion. Forty percent of the leisure time of an American adult is spent before the TV. See
Benedict Carey, Turn Off the TV HEALTH, Oct. 1994, at 81, 82.
The mass media have become so pervasive that people treat them as if what they see
portrayed is real. Even the devices used to disseminate media content (such as televisions
and computers) are assigned human qualities. See Deborah Stead, Sex, Lies and Semiconduc-
tors: The Human Links, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1996, at F8 (reviewing BYRON REEVES & CLIFFORD
NASs, THE MEDIA EQUATION: How PEOPLE TREAT COMPUTERS, TELEVISION AND NEW MEDIA
LIE REAL PEOPLE AND PLACES (1996)).
2 Television, in particular, has been roundly criticized. See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL.,
HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIE 279-81 (1985)
(the American viewer is steeped in the consumption-centered version of the good life that
television neatly packages and delivers in continuous form); NEIL POSTMAN, CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTIONS 168 (1988) (television is the principal agent of the American "intellectual
suicide").
3 Rick Vanderknyff, Pop Music: Positively Outspoken Negativland: The band takes to Bogart's
the kind of electronic message of artistic freedom that got it into legal trouble with U2, LA TIMES,
May 8, 1993, at FI; see also Steven Mirkin, Fair Use: The Story of the Letter "U" and the Numeral
"2,"ENT. WKLY., Feb. 17, 1995 (music review).
4 See infra notes 16 and 19, and text accompanying notes 19 and 20. Trademark law is
sometimes used for a similar purpose and to similar effect. See Robyn Meredith, Rock Hall
of Fame Asserts Ownership of Image, N.Y. TiMrSsJune 16, 1996, at A12. Constraints on expres-
sion caused by assertion of trademark rights are addressed in Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We be Paying Rent?, 20 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS
123 (1996).
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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freedom to copy works, not only of popular culture, but of all
kinds. In other words, people creating art should be permitted to
copy anything and everything. This is not to suggest that copyright
serves no purpose: destroying the copyright edifice merely to pro-
tect the ability of certain artists to create would be dangerous and
foolhardy. Practical limitations on an artist's privilege to copy can
be imposed to preserve copyright's incentives for creation.
An artist's privilege to copy may at first seem extreme, but
closer examination will reveal that both copyright theory and copy-
right owners can accommodate such copying. To test the pro-
posed privilege, this Article will use a genre of art-appropriation
art-that has gained some notoriety in the art and legal worlds be-
cause of its obvious and deliberate copying. Appropriation art will
therefore serve as a paradigm; if the proposal can justify copying by
an appropriation artist, then it will alsojustify less extreme copying.
Let us begin, then, by examining two scenarios involving artistic
appropriation as it is presently practiced.
1. Case One
A museumgoer at a New York art gallery approached an exhib-
ited photograph of a nude by Edward Weston. Setting up a cam-
era, she photographed the work, intending to create a photograph
as close to the original as possible. Some time later, she exhibited
her photograph of the work (titled "After Edward Weston") in a
gallery show of her photographs. The museumgoer/photographer
is Sherrie Levine, a New York artist, part of whose work once con-
sisted of creating just such exact photographic reproductions of
photographs.7
2. Case Two
An artist, browsing tourist-oriented souvenir shops in search of
inspiration, discovered a postcard bearing a sentimental portrayal
of a string of puppies spread across the laps of a couple seated next
to one another. Deciding that the image captured the theme he
was seeking (his work based on the card was ultimately exhibited as
part of his "Banality Show"), the artist sent the postcard to an Ital-
ian studio, where artisans crafted a sculpture (and three copies)
from the photograph. The artist wasJeff Koons, whose work illumi-
nates the art inherent in the ordinary by borrowing images from
popular culture and transforming them into different media.
7 See Carlin, supra note 1; Gerald Marzorati, Art in the (Re)Making, ART NEWS, May 1986,
at 90, 97.
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B. Aesthetic Vocabulary
Case One and Case Two are linked by the artists' using the
work of others as raw material for new art. Each case describes the
creation of a work of "appropriation art,"8 which we can define for
present purposes as a post-modern technique using images funda-
mental to a culture (and therefore not created by the artist, who
creates from the standpoint of an outsider) to make a point about
that culture.9 Appropriation art was chosen for these examples be-
cause it often produces a clear-cut case of copyright infringement.
Additional, less obvious examples exist;10 if the two selected exam-
ples are protected, however, the additional examples will be pro-
tected as well.
Aesthetic vocabulary has existed in all times and all places;
only its private ownership is new.11 Historically, the use of aesthetic
vocabulary did not implicate copyright or other intellectual prop-
erty protections because the language of art did not include trade-
marks, trade names, or copyrighted works. 12  The latter were
simply not disseminated widely enough to become part of a cul-
ture's aesthetic vocabulary. With advancing technology, however,
it has become both possible and profitable to saturate entire popu-
lations with images. As a result, privately owned images have be-
come ubiquitous. In Sherrie Levine's words, "[t] he world is filled
to suffocating. Man has placed his token on every stone. Every
work, every image is leased and mortgaged."1 " Thus, artists are de-
prived of their vocabulary, their source materials, and ultimately,
the basic elements of their expression.
The shift from public to private ownership of aesthetic vocabu-
lary is not merely an "arty" development. Art is essential to cultural
8 The evolution and significance of appropriation art is described in Carlin, supra note
1, at 106, 108-11.
9 One could debate whether an image is "fundamental" to the culture in which it
originated, whether an image can be fundamental to a culture in which it did not originate
(in which case it may have been appropriated by that culture), whether a work makes a
point about a culture, and so on. Thus it may never be entirely clear whether a given work
"qualifies" as appropriation art. Ultimately, however, the genre in which a work of art may
be pigeonholed is unimportant for legal purposes; the privilege proposed in this Article is
in any event substantially broader, applying to visual art in general. Appropriation art,
however, furnishes an uncommonly fine example of the legal problem today, and there-
fore is the basis for the factual examples presented.
10 See, e.g., Thomas Hine, Notable Quotables: Why Images Become Icons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
1996, § 2, at 1 (describing common uses of aesthetic vocabulary).
11 See MARTHA WOODMANSEE & PETERJASZI, Introduction to THE CONSTRUCTION OF Au-
THORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE (Martha Woodmansee & Peter
Jaszi eds., 1994).
12 See Hine, supra note 10.
13 Carlin, supra note 1, at 137-38 (quoting MAGAZINE OF THE WADSWORTH ATHENEUM 7
(Spring 1987)).
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health; art in society is necessary, not optional. Tyrannical govern-
ments have long attempted either to suppress art or to channel it
into politically correct themes and statements. Fortunately-not
only for artists but for all of us-both suppression and channeling
of art have proven, in the long run, to be impossible.
To state that artists perform important functions in society,
however, is not to deny the importance of intellectual property
rights. Indeed, the rights asserted against artists by the owners of
aesthetic vocabulary are significant. As intellectual property be-
comes vital to the American economy, 14 its owners are increasingly
inclined to enforce their rights vigorously. The cultural signifi-
cance or role of an image in no way reduces this inclination. Cul-
tural significance implies wide recognition, and therein lies a
marketing opportunity. So cultural significance, if anything, en-
hances the likelihood of vigorous enforcement of rights. From the
artist's perspective, what is happening is an Armageddon of owner-
ship, crushing the ability of artists to comment on the very phe-
nomenon that is taking away their tools. The dilemma, then, is
that we must communicate, but more and more of the necessary
words, images, and sounds are private property.
Several factors combine to create this dilemma. First, tech-
nology facilitates both the manufacture and the appropriation of
culture. Sherrie Levine's art is made possible by the camera, which
is needed to create both the copied and the copying works. In
addition, technology has produced a centralized culture. Commu-
nication technology delivers entertainment to huge audiences
from a single source, such as a television broadcaster or a cable
system.15 This centralization greatly simplifies the sale and control,
and thereby the exploitation, of culture. The entertainment of im-
mense audiences is determined by relatively efficient transactions;
moreover, because the audiences are so large, the sale of advertis-
ing in mass media can be a highly profitable enterprise. This
causes a kind of conditioning: once the audience (which may
number into the millions) has been heavily exposed to a particular
14 By some estimates, the information industry generates over $400 billion in revenue
annually. It employs seven million people. Foreign sales alone in 1990-seven years ago-
are estimated to account for $40 billion. In that year, only two economic sectors (aviation
and agriculture) produced more exports. See Marshall Leaffer, Protecting Authors' Rights in a
Digital Age, 27 U. TOL. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1995).
15 Consider, for example, the changes in music distribution. Historically, it was deliv-
ered by living human beings, to the limited audience physically able to be present at the
location of the performance. Today, MTV has an audience that, merely by virtue of its size,
could not have existed as a single assembly of persons in earlier times. All forms of mod-
em mass entertainment are likewise manufactured and delivered to an audience that, by
historical standards, is enormous.
1997] 253
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kind of content, it becomes much more difficult for new or differ-
ent content to attract the audience's attention. People prefer the
familiar.
But it is not merely familiarity that results in the power of
images from mass culture; rather, such power is a deliberate effect
of the process of image creation. Advertising agencies and other
purveyors of mass entertainment know which images most
powerfully evoke emotion and sensation, and they know that the
use of such images will attract a mass audience. Ultimately, such
images are assimilated into contemporary aesthetic vocabulary, and
at this point, the images become potential tools of communication
for artists. Unfortunately for artists, however, the images are simul-
taneously realizing their maximum value as marketing tools. Copy-
ing such images, whether or not for artistic purposes, is likely to
result in litigation. 16
Nor are there many appealing alternatives: effective communi-
cation requires artists to use the aesthetic vocabulary of their
times." It is hard to imagine commenting to present-day society,
about present-day society, without using a present-day aesthetic vo-
16 See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); United Feature Syndicate, Inc.
v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055(RO),
1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993). These cases arose out of appropriation artist Jeff
Koons's "Banality Show." Perhaps even more than Koons, Sherrie Levine has made it clear
that copying was the point of her work. By "taking" the pictures and showing them as hers,
she wanted it understood that she was deliberately undermining the most hallowed princi-
ples of contemporary art: originality, intention, and expression. See Carlin, supra note 1, at
137. Her works clearly state their ancestry: their titles name the author of the copied work.
But Levine's copies, though precise, take advantage of randomness and happenstance to
vary from the copied works. For example, she has incorporated the imperfections of the
printing process into her work. It at 138. Regarding her "bookplates," she states: "I
wanted to make pictures which maintained their reference to the bookplates. And I
wanted them to have a material presence that was as interesting as, but quite different
from, the original." Id.
17 Aesthetic vocabulary transcends the visual arts; its importance is, for example, quite
visible in music. To illustrate: at the time of this writing, popular ("Top 40") music is
commercially the most highly prized genre, notwithstanding its banality and repetition.
The market for recorded popular music owes its size in part to the ability of popular music
to reach people; i.e., to move their emotions in a way that is ultimately experienced as
pleasurable. Music of the old masters (commonly referred to as "classical" music) uses the
aesthetic vocabulary of the past, and therefore, while it appeals to many people, its audi-
ence is more limited. Finally, music that completely ignores aesthetic vocabulary has been
composed, mostly in this century. Such music is often referred to as "serious" music of the
twentieth century, and its chief distinction is its complete opacity to most listeners (includ-
ing most of the academicians at whom it is apparently aimed). See Bernard Holland, Classi-
cal View: Composers' Whys Affect the Wats, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1996, at H24. Of course,
whether in music or the visual arts, contemporary aesthetic vocabulary includes images
from the past. See Hine, supra note 10. But these are outnumbered by present-day images.
See id. This Article concerns itself exclusively with the visual arts; a counterpart privilege to
copy music is interesting, but beyond the scope of this work.
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cabulary. To do so, however, will infringe copyright.18 In other
words, when the aesthetic vocabulary of a culture becomes private
property, copyright is positioned in opposition to art.
C. Copyright vs. Art
There is no question that activities like those of Sherrie Levine
and Jeff Koons infringe copyrights unless there is some principle
exempting their works. Analyzed by conventional means, Sherrie
Levine infringed Edward Weston's copyright;19 Jeff Koons, too,
learned painfully that the law is unimpressed by claims of "art."2"
Several commentators have recognized this opposing align-
ment of copyright and art, and have proposed solutions to the
problem.21 The proposals, however, have serious flaws; none, for
example, adequately take into account the circumstances of the
artist and of art." Furthermore, because the problem arises from
an opposing alignment of copyright and art, a solution based only
on existing paradigms of copyright protection will tend to favor the
copyright holder, at the expense of the artist.23 Other commenta-
tors appear to favor the abolition of copyright altogether, a sugges-
tion that perhaps makes up in boldness what it lacks in elegance.24
This Article proposes that copyright can-and should-be
18 [I]fyou are a nineteenth-century painter, and you painted what is out there...
you didn't inadvertently suck up any copyrighted material. But if you are a
twentieth-century artist... and ... you want to paint what is out there, you will
infringe on somebody else's copyright, because the environment is so polluted
with protected imagery.
Virtual Reality, Appropriation, and Property Rights in Art: A Roundtable Discussion, 13 CARDOZO
Awrs & ENr. L.J. 89, 99 (1994) (comments ofJohn Carlin).
19 Certainly, attorneys for Weston's estate thought so when they saw Levine's work, and
threatened to sue her for copyright infringement. See Marzorati, supra note 7, at 97. Le-
vine thereafter stopped photographing Weston's work-or any work that would raise a
copyright problem-limiting her subject matter to works in the public domain, those
owned by the government, or those originating in countries that had no copyright agree-
ment with the United States. See Carlin, supra note 1, at 137. Had she not so limited her
work, an example might have been made of her, as it was of Jeff Koons. See cases cited
supra note 16.
20 See cases cited supra note 16.
21 See infra notes 91-106 and accompanying text.
22 Any distinction between art and non-art will inevitably be clouded by the ambiguity
concerning the relationship of criticism to art and the meaning of terms like "talent" and
.achievement" in the context of art. That a distinction is difficult or imprecise, of course,
is no reason not to attempt it, especially when the consequences of the failure to distin-
guish outweigh the difficulties of the distinction itself. This Article will argue that a service-
able definition of "art" already exists (in the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, Tit. VI, § 603(a), 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A & scattered
additional sections of 17 U.S.C. (1994))), and will adopt that definition, with some modifi-
cations, for the purpose of defining the works that will qualify for the privilege proposed
here. See infra part III.
23 An example of this is found in the efforts to solve the problem using an approach
based on the fair use doctrine. See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
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saved. It suggests a solution to the problem created by the private
ownership of aesthetic vocabulary, a solution faithful to the nature
of art, calibrated to artists' circumstances, but in full accord with
copyright theory. It may be stated simply: artists should be free to
copy whatever they like, whenever they wish. In part I, this Article
examines the nature and the purposes of copyright, and the doc-
trines enabling the achievement of those purposes. It also exam-
ines the exceptions to those doctrines, and the reasons the
exceptions are necessary. Part II examines the problems posed by
the privatization of aesthetic vocabulary, and several approaches
suggested to remedy those problems. Part III sets out the details of
the proposed artists' privilege, exempting artists from copyright in-
fringement litigation based upon both the nature of art and the
underpinnings of copyright. The Article concludes that the privi-
lege will preserve both art and copyright.
I. THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT
A. Copyright, Authorship, and Originality
Authorship is fundamental to copyright. In the United States,
copyright vests initially in the author; it cannot, as a constitutional
matter, vest in another.25 The Copyright Act defines the subject
matter protected by copyright as "original works of authorship."21
Clearly, if one is not an author, one's work is not protected by
copyright. But what is meant by the term "author?" The Act pro-
vides no definition for this term.27
The quintessential characteristic of copyright authorship is
creation, and creation provides much of the justification for the
author's exclusive rights. 28 But what is "creation?"29 The Act tells
us that a work is created "when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord
for the first time."' 0 Thus, for copyright purposes, the act of fixa-
tion defines creation. Is the one who "fixes" then the "author?"
Surely not, or at least not always: the author dictating to the stenog-
rapher remains the author, notwithstanding that the stenographer
carries out the act of fixation."1 Perhaps the answer lies elsewhere:
25 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
26 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
27 Some commentators believe that "there is still no genuinely viable definition of [the
term] 'author.'" See Russ VerSteeg, Defining "Author"for Purposes of Copyright, 45 AM. U. L.
P1v. 1323, 1338-39 (1996);Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 235 (1991).
28 See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
29 On the ambiguity of the term "creation," see VerSteeg, supra note 27, at 1338 n.92.
30 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definition of "created").
31 The Act says as much: "A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when'its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
[Vol. 15:249
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the Act protects that which is original to the author. Does the re-
quirement of originality in fact add anything to the requirement of
creation? Courts pondering this question have not always agreed.
Before the landmark case of Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone
Service,32 most cases and commentators treated the copyright re-
quirement of "originality" as meaning that the initial copyright
holder was the person who "made," "created," or "originated" the
work." Such cases imposed no additional requirement of inspira-
tion or creativity. Indeed, some viewed such a requirement as anti-
thetical to copyright, because of the danger of federal judges
functioning as art critics in passing on copyright questions. 4
Under this approach, a work was protected simply because it was
the author's creation. As such, it was hers, much as a piece of
furniture she might build would belong to her. The work merited
protection simply because it was the author's labor that called it
forth. No more was necessary. This approach, sometimes called
the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, prevailed for much of the twenti-
eth century.3 5
Feist, however, squarely held that "originality" for copyright
purposes means both that the work owes its origin to the author and
that the work demonstrates a "creative spark."3 6 The author must
be more than just accountable for the work's existence; she must
demonstrate at least some minimal creativity to receive the benefits
of copyright.37 The "creative spark" requirement implies an in-
creased likelihood that the work will be meritorious. Under Feist,
because the work is creative, it is protected: copyright is something
that must be, earned by some enhancement of the odds that the
work will have some merit.38 Thus, present-day conceptions of au-
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
for a period of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "fixed").
Obviously a fixation "under the authority of the author" is not the same thing as a fixation
"by the author"; the former implies fixation by a person other than the author.
32 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
33 "'Original' in reference to a copyrighted work means that the particular work 'owes
its origin' to the 'author.'" Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102
(2d Cir. 1951) (quoting Burrows-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58
(1884)); seeRoth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1970);
Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gerter, 352 F.2d 298, 301 (9th Cir. 1965); Wihtol v. Wells,
231 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1956). Under this approach, an author is one who creates an
original work; "original" in this sense means that the work did not exist before the author
originated it. See Burrnzo-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58. The work must be independently created,
and not copied from other works. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
s4 See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
35 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 352-56 (citing cases).
36 Id. at 345.
37 Id. at 345-46.
38 Cf BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF CorvmcHr 46 (1967) ("We can, I
1997]
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thorship imply both origination and creativity, wrapped in the ap-
pellation "originality," which in turn justifies the author's exclusive
rights.3 19 We turn, then, to an examination of the rights comprised
in copyright.
B. The Nature of Copyright
American copyright today is often described as a "bundle of
rights."4  Though it may be trite, the phrase is nevertheless accu-
think, conclude that to make the copyright turnstile revolve, the author should have to
deposit more than a penny in the box . . ").
S9 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301; see alsoJames Boyle, A Theory of
Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CALIF. L. REv. 1415
(1992) [hereinafter Boyle, A Theory]; James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare
and the Framers, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 625, 632-43 (1988); Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect:
Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 297-305
(1992), reprinted in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW
AND LITERATURE, supra note 11. This idea of the author as a solitary genius, the creator of
a thing of beauty, is implicit in the Feist view of authorship, and has been challenged by
some commentators. See, e.g., Boyle, A Theory, supra, at 1415, 1453, 1463; Jessica Litman,
The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966-67 (1990). In the view of Feist's critics, author-
ship is
more akin to translation and recombination than it is to creating .... Compos-
ers recombine sounds they have heard before; playwrights base their characters
on bits and pieces drawn from real human beings and other playwrights' char-
acters; novelists draw their plots from lives and other plots within their experi-
ence; software writers use the logic they find in other software; lawyers
transform old arguments to fit new facts; cinematographers, actors, choreogra-
phers, architects, and sculptors all engage in the process of adapting, trans-
forming, and recombining what is already "out there" in some other form.
Id. at 966-67 (footnotes omitted); see also Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Misappropriation,
17 U. DAYRON L. REv. 885 (1992); Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARV L.
REv. 801 (1993). In short, everything has been said and done before. See, e.g., Emerson v.
Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any,
things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout.
Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow,
and use much which was well known and used before .... No man writes
exclusively from his own thoughts, unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts
of others. The thoughts of every man are, more or less, a combination of what
other men have thought and expressed, although they may be modified, ex-
alted, or improved by his own genius or reflection.
Id. at 619, quoted in Alfred C. Yen, The Interdisciplinary Future of Copyright Theory, 10 CARDozo
ARTS & ENr. L. J. 423, 424 n.4 (1992); cf. Marci A. Hamilton, Appropriation Art and the
Imminent Decline in Authorial Control Over Copyrighted Works, 42J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 93, 102-03
(1994) (questioning whether "the concept of romantic authorship .. . is a viable trend
within American copyright culture").
40 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985);
Hamilton, supra note 39, at 95; Leaffer, supra note 14, at 4. It was not always so. Before the
adoption of the Act, copyright was considered "monolithic." Monolithic copyright cannot,
in theory, be subdivided or transferred in units less than the whole; as a practical matter
various ways around this impediment were found. One consequence of the theoretically
indivisible copyright was the great importance attached to the distinction between an "as-
signment" of copyright and a mere copyright "license." The former was a transfer of the
entire copyright; the latter did not amount to a transfer (as indeed it could not, since less
than the entire interest was involved), but was just a contractual promise by the ,licensor
not to sue the licensee for copyright infringement during the lifetime of the license,., To-
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rate: copyright comprises a number of distinct interests. Foremost
among these are the owner's economic interests, each of which is
premised on one or more means to exploit works of authorship.
Thus, in section 106, the Act gives authors the exclusive right to
reproduce the work, to adapt the work, to distribute copies of the
work, to perform the work publicly, to display the work publicly,
and (in the case only of sound recordings) to perform a work pub-
licly by means of a digital audio transmission.41 Copyright is
designed to make it difficult to profit from a work without the au-
thor's permission (and possible participation in the profit).
Each right in the copyright bundle may be transferred sepa-
rately, and each may be divided as finely as the parties wish. More-
over, if the right (or fragment of the right) is transferred
exclusively, the transferee is considered an "owner of copyright"
for all purposes of the Act, thereby acquiring the ability to enforce
the right in court against all comers, including the transferor.42
The principle applies as much to rights or fragments transferred
for a limited time as to those transferred "in perpetuity" (that is,
for their entire duration).4a
The rights we have discussed so far-the rights of exploita-
tion-can be distinguished from another, more basic set of rights;
namely, the rights of consent. While the exploitation rights give
the author exclusive rights to exploit the work for profit, the con-
sent rights give the author exclusive rights to consent to someone
else exploiting the work (and, of course, the right to refuse consent
if the compensation offered is inadequate)." Consent rights are
necessary, practically speaking, because authors are themselves sel-
dom able to exploit their works commercially; the transfer of a
right to a third party better able to do so, such as a publisher, can
day, less than the entire interest in a copyright can be transferred, but an important dis-
tinction remains between exclusive and non-exclusive licenses. Non-exclusive licenses
under the Act are the equivalent of"licenses" under the pre-1978 law, and do not transfer
any part of a copyright. An "exclusive license" under the Act is similar to an "assign-
ment"-that is, a transfer-under the old law. An exclusive license is limited, however, to
the particular rights licensed. Under either version of the law, only an owner of copyright
can sue for copyright infringement. Therefore, being found merely a "licensee" under the
old statute or a "non-exclusive licensee" under the Act means that one will be unable to
enforce the licensed right; rather, the licensee will have to look to the licensor to enforce
the licensee's rights.
41 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(a)-(f) (1994) (enumerating the exclusive rights of authors). In
addition, section 1101 adds an exclusive right of fixation for musical performances. See 17
U.S.CA § 1101 (West 1996).
42 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (1994).
*43 Id.
- 44 The idea is expressed indirectly in the 1976 Act by giving the author the exclusive
right."to do and to autho'izd' the listed actions. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (emphasis ad-
ded);-see also Hamilton, supra note 39, at 95-96.
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be analyzed as an exercise of the corresponding consent right. An
author may deny consent for any reason, or none at all.45 The
right to deny consent does not depend upon any actual or
threatened exploitation by a third party for profit (that is, it does
not depend upon threatened infringement), and it may be as-
serted even against a use that society regards as desirable.46
C. The Purpose of Copyright
The most obvious effect of copyright is to permit authors to
charge a fee for the exercise of an exclusive right. For a work that
is in demand, the potential economic value of the author's exclu-
sive rights is intuitively clear, and the incentive to create generated
by such rights seems obvious. For works not in demand, the incen-
tive is less visible. Regardless, it appears there will always be some
authors motivated by the hope of future success in the market-
place, no matter how elusive the success or unrealistic the hope.47
Because of copyright's obvious rewards to authors, it is tempt-
ing to conclude that the purpose of copyright is to reward authors
for creating their works. Copyright's primary purpose, however, is
not to reward authors. Instead, as expressed in the Constitution,
its aim is "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."4"
This primary aim is to be accomplished "by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries."4 9 The emphasis is on promoting
the progress of science and the useful arts, not on securing exclu-
sive rights to authors and inventors. The point of copyright is not
the reward per se, but rather incentive effect: the reward reaped by
45 The exception, when consent rights are absent but exploitation rights are not, in-
volves the mechanism called the compulsory license. A work subject to a compulsory li-
cense may be used under the circumstances specified by the license (usually found in a
statute), upon payment of the specified fee. See infra part I.D.2. When consent rights are
absent, however, the exploitation rights are no longer exclusive, but are shared with the
compulsory licensee(s).
46 There are situations when a use is considered sufficiently valuable to society, and the
potential for harm to the author sufficiently remote, that the author's consent and ex-
ploitation rights are abridged. Such cases fall under the fair use doctrine. In this sense the
fair use doctrine functions as a sort of "safety valve," relieving pressure created by the occa-
sionally rigid rules of copyright. See infra part I.D.1.
47 Or at least this is what the economic incentive presupposes. Not everyone accepts
the economic incentive underlying copyright; some maintain a more-or-less pure "natural
rights" approach-for example David Ladd, the Register of Copyrights from 1980-85. See
David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30J. COPRIGHT Soc'v 421 (1983).
Others find the American idea of copyright, with its economic underpinnings, more sti-
fling than helpful insofar as public access to works is concerned, and occasionally call for
the abolition of copyright altogether. See, e.g., Jaszi, supra note 39.
48 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
49 Id.
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copyright holders is constitutionally significant only to the extent it
"promote [s] the Progress of Science and useful Arts."50
Notably absent from this formulation is any judgment of qual-
ity. Given the choice, most of us would probably opt to read one
good book rather than a dozen (or a thousand) poor ones. Why
does copyright appear indifferent to quality? The answer lies partly
in the difficulty of accurately and objectively measuring something
as elusive as the "quality" of a work. History is replete with exam-
ples of works, hailed today as the products of genius, but reviled by
experts at their creation as worthless.5 ' In light of the rather dis-
mal history of failure by critics and other experts to anticipate his-
tory's judgments, the arbiters of copyright (for example, federal
judges) are unlikely to be a reliable barometer of quality in art,52
and copyright law requires no such determinations.
While unreliability alone would be enough reason to banish
notions of aesthetic quality from copyright, judging the "quality" of
art is additionally dangerous to free speech. "The marketplace of
ideas which the First Amendment nurtures is ... essentially a copy-
right marketplace."55 Deciding which works are worthy of copy-
right, and, therefore, which authors deserve remuneration, is rife
with potential for oppression of unpopular persons and suppres-
sion of unpopular ideas.5" Thus, to permit the federal judiciary to
decide copyrightability according to quality would be both aestheti-
50 See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Twenti-
eth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Leaffer, supra note 14, at 5.
To say that the remunerative aspect of copyright is secondary, however, is not to diminish
its practical importance: the constitutional scheme depends on the continued value of the
reproduction right. The exclusive rights of authors must remain sufficiently valuable to
stimulate authors to produce new works, thereby ultimately benefitting the public. Thus,
copyright remunerates authors, who respond by creating additional "works"; new authors,
seeing an opportunity to earn a reward, continually arise to replace the old.
51 A brief list of the luminaries who were sharply criticized by their contemporaries,
sometimes to the point of being disparaged as charlatans, would include James Joyce, Mar-
cel Proust, D.H. Lawrence, Ludwig van Beethoven, and Igor Stravinsky. For more on the
mutability of taste and the perception of aesthetic quality, see generally BERNHARD BEREN-
SON, AESTHETICS AND HISTORY OF VisuAL ART passim (1948); Goredana Lazarevich, The
Changing Perception of the Composer, STRUCrURIST, 1985-1986, 59-64.
52 In the words of Justice Holmes, "[i] t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illus-
trations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits." Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho-
graphing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). The exception to which Holmes refers arises from
the necessity of determining whether a given work possesses the requisite "originality" to
qualify as a copyrightable work at all. Id.
53 Ladd, supra note 47, at 426 (emphasis in original).
,54 In the words of Justice O'Connor, "it should not be forgotten that the Framers in-
tended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable
right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create
and disseminate ideas." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558.
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cally undesirable and unacceptably dangerous to free speech. 5
Is the challenge of distinguishing the genius from the hack
too intimidating for copyright? It is. Nevertheless, saying that copy-
right is indifferent to quality would be wrong. Rather, copyright
takes an indirect approach: by encouraging the production of
more works, copyright encourages the production of more good
works; by not explicitly including quality in the incentive structure,
copyright avoids regulating expression.56
Copyright's purpose, then, is to remunerate authors, but not
because society believes them to be inherently noble or deserving
of remuneration. Instead, copyright aims to benefit society as a
whole by ensuring access to more works, and thereby access to
more good works. Copyright's essential strategy is to manipulate di-
rectly an aspect of the legal system-securing exclusive rights to
authors-to accomplish a goal that cannot be achieved by direct
manipulation-increasing the quantity and quality of the works to
which the public has access.
D. Exceptions to Authorial Exclusivity
To this point, we have assumed that the author's "exclusive"
right of reproduction is literally exclusive. A closer look reveals,
however, that copyright "exclusivity" is more figurative than real.
Manifestly, there are practical exceptions to exclusivity: the fair use
55 There is another reason that copyright does not inquire into quality: copyright rests
(at least in part) on a foundation of natural law. That is, copyright is not granted to an
author so much as it naturally inheres in the author, as the creator of the work. See, e.g.,
Ladd, supra note 47, at 426 (quoting Prof. Nathaniel Shaler:
[I]ntellectual property is, after all, the only absolute possession in the world
.... The man who brings out of the nothingness some child of his thought has
rights therein which cannot belong to any other sort of property .... The
inventor of a book or other contrivance of thought holds his property, as a god
holds it, by right of creation).
Consequently, unlike a patent, copyright is not something that is applied for and granted;
rather, copyright arises from the moment a work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expres-
sion. The application to the government is for a registration of copyright, as distinct from a
grant of copyright; the Copyright Office does not function as a "gatekeeper," but merely
records the already-extant fact of copyright. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) ("[c]opyright protec-
tion subsists . .. in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion"), 408 ("[a]t any time during the subsistence of. . . copyright . . . the owner of
copyright... may obtain registration of the copyright claim") (1994); Aft. of Copyright
Office Examiner Frank Vitalos, Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452 (2d
Cir. 1990) (Nos. 527, 619, 89-7829, 89-7887) (copy on file with the author). Therefore, any
work will be protected, provided it is original to the author and is fixed in a tangible
medium of expression. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
56 Moreover, it is doubtful that there exist any feasible means to affect quality directly
through legal rules. The difficulties experienced by art critics in making contemporary
judgments about quality, see supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text, testify to the impos-
sibility even of defining aesthetic quality in a way that transcends a narrow time and place.
Certainly no one interested in art wants Congress to legislate artistic "quality" standards.
As a practical matter, therefore, quality must be enhanced indirectly.
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doctrine 5 7 compulsory licenses,58 and hybrids of these59 are the ba-
sis for many common-and lawful-occasions of copying. Can
such copying without the author's consent be justified under the
constitutional scheme for copyright? It can, and not merely in a
manner consistent with that scheme, but in fact required by it.
The exceptions to the exclusive right of reproduction arise
from copyright's dominant purpose. Ultimately, increased public
access to works of authorship depends on preservation of the in-
centive to create; the economic value of the author's exclusive
rights must not be impaired. But not every unauthorized exercise
of the author's rights will impair the economic incentive to create.
Determining whether an exception to the author's exclusive rights
should apply, then, is in part to determine whether any particular
unauthorized use is dangerous because it impairs the economic in-
centive to create (or whether it is less dangerous, or perhaps not at
all dangerous, because little or no harm is done to the creative
incentive). An analysis built on this foundation provides a frame-
work within which exceptions to authorial exclusivity can be as-
sessed meaningfully, that is, in terms of encouraging or
discouraging the production of additional works.
The analysis must begin with an axiom: copyright law should
permit a use that serves copyright's ultimate goal. A use that in-
creases public access to works, in both the long and the short term,
should be permitted by copyright-even if the author's rights
thereby appear to be invaded. Both the long-term and short-term
perspectives are important here; alone, the short-term perspective
is insufficient as a basis for principled decisions regarding excep-
tions to authorial exclusivity. Virtually all uses will increase short-
term availability, if only by adding to existing availability the partic-
ular use in question. From a long-term perspective, however, with-
out the author's consent, a use may function as a disincentive to
authors, and thereby damage the public good by diminishing the
flow of new works.
The creative incentive of copyright is not measured directly;
instead, the economic impact of the use is used as a proxy. The
impact of any use on copyright's economic incentive to create is
directly proportional to the economic impact of that use; the
greater the positive impact, the more creative incentive is provided,
and the greater the adverse economic impact, the more harm is
57 See infra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
58 See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
59 See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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done to the economic incentive to create. 60 Any unauthorized use
undermines copyright only to the extent that it impairs the eco-
nomic incentive to create: if a use does not harm the incentive to
create, it will not diminish the public's access to works of author-
ship, and copyright's purposes are served by the additional incre-
ment of access that the use provides.
A strong case for an exception can be made, therefore, when a
use provides a significant public benefit, in the form of increased
access to works, and the author's economic incentive to create new
works is not, or is only minimally, impaired. Slight impairment
may be acceptable because accomplishing copyright's purpose re-
quires us to weigh, against the impairment, the public benefit ac-
cruing from the exception.61 For example, assume that a
particular use enhances the public good by increasing access to
works of authorship. Assume further that this use does some harm,
by diminishing the author's economic incentive to create. If the
use does more harm than it does good-for example, if it eliminates
the author's economic incentive to create-we should conclude
that the use does not serve the goal of copyright and should be
treated as copyright infringement. But if the use provides more
benefit than it causes harm, it should be treated as an exception to
authorial exclusivity.6" In other words, the conclusion that an ex-
ception is justifiable does not require an utter lack of impact on
60 It follows that a use with no economic impact is neutral with respect to copyright's
creative incentive.
61 It may be that, as a practical matter, any unconsented or uncompensated use at least
arguably diminishes, however slightly, the author's incentive to create. We can assume,
without conceding, that this is the case.
62 The difficulty of measuring both the benefit and the harm counsels conservatism in
declaring exceptions to authorial exclusivity. Thus, we should look for relatively clear-cut
cases of benefit outweighing harm, lest the imprecision of our measurement mislead us.
Moreover, the balancing of public benefit against public harm does not amount, as some
have feared, to "accord [ing] lesser rights in those works that are of greatest importance to
the public." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559. As the Court recognized in Harper & Row,
author's rights ought not to vary according to the kind of work the author produces.
Rather than changing the scope of the author's rights, the balancing required by copyright
is sensitive to the nature of the allegedly infringing use made of a work. It is a more precise
way of measuring the rights of an author, which do not extend further than necessary to
provide a creative incentive and thereby enhance public access to works of authorship.
What copyright balances is public harm against public good, not detriment to the author
against the social value of dissemination. Cf id. (quoting Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1615 (1982)). Detriment to the author is not a substitute for harm to
the public caused by diminished access to works, although it may be a factor in determin-
ing the likelihood of such harm. "If every volume that was in the public interest could be
pirated away by a competing publisher ... the public [soon] would have nothing worth
reading." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559 (quoting Lionel S. Sobel, Copyright and the First
Amendment: A Gathering Storm ?, 19 COPYRGHT L. Smer. (ASCAP) 43, 78 (1971)). This is why
"public harm" for our purposes is more accurately measured by harm to the creative incen-
tive, and not by economic harm to the author. See infra note 65.
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the author's economic incentive. Rather, it requires a balancing of
public harm against public good.
Courts engage regularly, although not always consciously, in
this balancing exercise. It is most visible in cases involving the fair
use doctrine, Which provides that in certain circumstances a work
may be copied despite the absence of both consent from, and pay-
ment to, the author.63
1. Fair Use
The fair use doctrine provides a judicial safety net for certain
uses of copyrighted works: unauthorized use of a work does not
infringe copyright, if the use is "fair." The Act notes a few exam-
ples of uses that may be fair in appropriate circumstances, includ-
ing criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and
research.' Fair use is most likely to be found when the public ben-
efit of the use is relatively clear, and the public harm (in the form
of damage to the creative incentive) resulting from the use is rela-
tively attenuated.65
To decide whether a particular use is fair, the Act requires a
63 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Pub. Co., 510 U.S. 569
(1994); Sony, 464 U.S. 417; see also WILIAaM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT
LAw (1995); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 I-ARv. L. REv. 1105 (1990).
64 See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
65 See Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966).
The fundamental justification for the [fair use] privilege lies in the constitu-
tional purpose in granting copyright protection in the first instance, to wit, 'To
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts.' . . . To serve that purpose,
Icourts in passing upon particular claims of infringement must occasionally
subordinate the copyright holder's interest in a maximum financial return to
the greater public interest in the development of art ....
Id. (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Pubs., Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1964)); see also, Pacific &
S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984):
Fair use allows a court to resolve tensions between the ends of copyright law,
public enjoyment of creative works, and the means chosen under copyright law,
the conferral of economic benefits upon the creators of original works. Where
strict enforcement of the rights of a copyright holder.., would conflict with
the purpose of copyright law or with some other important societal value,
courts should be free to fashion an appropriate fair use exemption.
Id. Reduced public access to works of authorship is not usually addressed explicitly in
judicial analyses of fair use; when reduced access is considered, it is described in terms only
of the reduced access to the work in dispute. However, the statute requires a court to
consider the impact of the use on the market for the copied work. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
This is a measurement of the economic harm caused to the author of the copied work by
the use, and is, as a practical matter, often but not always the same as economic harm to
the economic incentive to create. For example, a very small economic harm to the author
is economic harm nonetheless, but it may well leave intact the author's incentive to create.
Similarly, the idea of economic harm to a person is relative; what is serious harm to an
author of modest means may be trivial to a wealthy author. Surely the scope of copyright
does not depend on the author's net worth; rather, what is important is the damage to the
economic incentive to create caused by the use, and not merely the creative incentive of
the author of the copied work, but of authors in general.
266 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 15:249
court to consider four nonexclusive factors: (1) the purpose and
character of the use, including whether it is for commercial or non-
profit purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted (the copied)66
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copied work as a whole;67 and (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copied work."s A
provision was added in 1992 to state explicitly that the fact that a
work is unpublished does not alone bar a fair use.69
The weight accorded each of these factors has varied over time
and with the nature of the use.7° Of the four factors, however, two
consistently rank among the most important: the market impact of
the use on the author of the copied work (the fourth factor)71 and
the purpose and character of the use (the first factor) .72 The sig-
nificance of market impact is easy to understand. Rational remu-
neration of authors depends on accurate information about both
authorized and unauthorized uses of their works.73 The adverse
market impact of an unauthorized use is seen most clearly when
the copying work functions as a perfect or near-perfect market sub-
stitute for the copied work. Market substitution is likely to severly
damage, if not eliminate altogether, copyright's economic incen-
66 Obviously, there may be (and in many cases are) two "copyrighted" works: one that
was copied (the "copied work") and one in which the copying occurred (the "copying
work"). The Act uses the term "copyrighted work" to refer to the former, and has no word
for the latter. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. The copying work, of course, will be copyrightable only
to the extent it does not infringe. Id. § 103(a).
67 The portion used is compared to the copied, rather than the copying, work. See 17
U.S.C. § 107. Thus it may be infringement to use 90% of a short work, even if the use
amounts only to 0.01% of the copying work. Moreover, "amount and substantiality" for
purposes of the Act are both quantitative and qualitative measures; if the "best parts" of a
work are taken, fair use is less likely than if unimportant parts are copied. See Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. at 566. Although not explicitly authorized by the Act, courts on occasion
examine the role played by the copied material in the copying work. See id.
68 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. All four factors must be considered, but none is exclusive. See
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549.
69 See Act of Oct. 24, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553-63.
70 Compare Sony, 464 U.S. 417 (fair use analysis confined to one paragraph; significant
emphasis laid on the "nature of the use"; any commercial use "presumptively unfair"), with
Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (extensive fair use analysis; commercial use potentially fair).
71 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-94; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 ("This ... factor
is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use") (footnote omitted); Salin-
ger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1997); Leval, supra note 63.
72 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. 569; Sony, 464 U.S. 417; KAPLAN, supra note 38, at 68;
Leval, supra note 63, at 1111.
73 The trend in the cases is to go beyond impact on the author's actual market to assess
impact on potential markets, sweeping in markets that the author herself may never have
identified or may even have specifically avoided. Salinger, 811 F.2d 90, makes a good illus7
tration. AuthorJ.D. Salinger's avowed intention was never to permit his letters to be pub-
lished. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit found an unauthorized use of his letters resulted
in a market impact: while the author's intention might appear to eliminate any existing
"market," it did not eliminate a potential market. Id. at 99.
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tive for artists to create. But lesser forms of harm exist as well. A
use may become unfair, and thus infringing, long before the crea-
tive incentive is destroyed. Any non-trivial adverse impact on the
copied author's market is enough to place the fair use defense out
of reach.74
Certain uses are more likely than others to further the policy
of copyright; the second factor consistently found important in fair
use cases is the purpose and character of the use. 75 This factor re-
quires an examination of the use and its tendency to further, or
impede, the primary goal of copyright. Courts and commentators
in recent years have stressed the idea that to be fair, a use should
be "transformative."76 A transformative use constitutes creative de-
parture from the original work. 7 7 Access to such a creative depar-
ture is presumably in the public interest; if the use meets this
criterion, it is more likely to be held non-infringing than if it is not
transformative. This analysis dovetails well with the market-impact
approach discussed immediately above, insofar as market substitu-
tion of a transformative work for the copied work is less likely than
the substitution of a nontransformative work: a "transformative"
work is by definition different in some important way from the cop-
ied work, and therefore is probably not a good substitute. Thus, to
the extent a use is transformative, adverse market impact is less
likely. 78
Fair use, then, describes the perimeter of authors' rights-a
boundary beyond which neither the rights of consent nor the
rights of exploitation extend. Compulsory licenses, to which we
now turn, principally abridge the author's right to consent (and
thus the ability to bargain remuneration), while providing at least
some remuneration for the licensed use.
2. Compulsory Licensing
As in fair use, the balancing of public good against public
harm is visible in compulsory licensing, but in a different form. A
compulsory license is a permission, provided by law (most often by
74 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566-67; Sony, 464 U.S. at 451, 484 n.36.
75 See supra note 72.
76 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. 569; Leval, supra note 63, passim.
77 See CampbeIl 510 U.S. at 579 (transformative use is one that "adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, mean-
ing or message"). The more "creative" or socially desirable the use, the more likely it is to
be deemed fair. A drawback to this approach is that courts will inevitably become bound
up in. questions of creativity, perilously close to artistic merit and contrary to Justice
Holmes's admonition in Bleistein, 188 U.S. 239.
78 See Campbel4 510 U.S. at 580 n.14.
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statute), to use a work in a way that, but for the license, would
infringe.79 It is typically conditioned upon the payment of a fee
(usually specified by statute) to the copyright holder or to some
agency for distribution to copyright holders. A comparison with
the fair use exception may be helpful: to the extent a use is "fair,"
the copied author lacks both the right to consent and the right to
receive remuneration. A compulsory license, by contrast, deprives
the copied author of the right to consent only (and incidentally of
the ability to bargain for the amount of remuneration). The right
to receive remuneration, as a fee, is preserved."0
Viewed from the perspective of balancing public good against
public harm, a compulsory license suggests that the public good
inherent in the licensed use is clear, and should be encouraged.
This encouragement is provided by depriving the author of the
right to consent to (or prohibit) the use, just as it is with fair use.
The compulsory license diverges from fair use, however, in that the
public harm of the former-that is, the possibility that the eco-
nomic incentive to create will be unacceptably diminished-is not
obviously outweighed by its public benefit.81 To tip the scales con-
sistently in favor of the public good, a use subject to compulsory
license is conditioned on payment of a license fee, providing some
compensation and additional creative incentive to the copied au-
thor and protecting the public from the consequences of a more
severe impairment of the economic incentive to create.
3. Hybrid Regulation
Certain uses are regulated by the Act as hybrids of fair use and
compulsory license. For such uses the Act provides neither con-
sent nor compensation rights to the author of the copied work (an
approach resembling fair use), but spells out in considerable detail
the requirements and limitations of the qualifying use (resembling
a compulsory license).8
79 The Act provides compulsory licenses for, among other things: fixing in a sound
recording and distributing to the public a musical work that has previously been recorded
and distributed (e.g., a performer's "re-make" of another performer's previously issued re-
cording), 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1994); certain secondary transmissions to the public of televi-
sion broadcasts embodying performances or displays of works, which would otherwise be
actionable, id. § 111(d); and certain performances of published nondramatic musical
works and displays of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works by public broadcasting enti-
ties, id. § 118.
80 Cf Hamilton, supra note 39, at 96 (analogizing compulsory licensing to constitu-
tional "taking" of real property).
81 This could be the result of the benefit being smaller, or the risk of harm being
greater.
82 "Hybrids" of the fair use and compulsory license approaches include, for example,
the provisions of the Act regarding copying in libraries and archives, see 17 U.S.C. § 108
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A hybrid approach can be useful, particularly when the fair
use doctrine cannot dependably exempt certain uses from in-
fringement claims. Usually these uses are justifiable in fair use
terms, meaning that the public good of the use clearly outweighs
the public harm. Minor issues of doctrine, however, unrelated to
the balancing of harm against good, may prevent such uses from
being considered "fair." For example, the fair use defense is rarely
available when the copied work is copied in its entirety,83 yet some-
times the public good might clearly be served by permitting such a
use. By carefully delineating a desired use in the statute, it can be
encouraged without encountering the difficulties of a judicial de-
termination of fairness.
Hybrid regulation also avoids another drawback of the fair use
doctrine: the "chilling" effect on authors who might wish to use a
work, but who are unable or unwilling to risk litigation to deter-
mine if their use will be considered "fair." It is difficult to predict
in advance whether a particular use will be pronounced fair if chal-
lenged by the author of the copied work. This uncertainty of out-
come of fair use litigation produces a "chilling" effect that may on
occasion stifle the use altogether. Merely the threat of litigation
can have a serious chilling effect on defendants of modest means.
A would-be user who is financially unable to fight a fair use battle
will avoid subjecting herself to the possibility of defending such a
lawsuit by avoiding the use altogether. 4 This chilling effect, by in-
hibiting uses that would increase public access to works of author-
ship, directly undermines copyright's goal.
Hybrid regulation can, however, sometimes avoid the fair use
chill. By carefully circumscribing the regulated use, hybrid regula-
tion avoids damage to the author's creative incentive; by greatly
reducing the likelihood of litigation over the use, hybrid regulation
avoids the chilling effect of the fair use doctrine.
II. COPYRIGHT OR ART?
In our media-saturated society,85 copyright is inevitably op-
(1994), and those concerning certain secondary transmissions in hotels, apartment build-
ings and the like, see id. § 111 (a). In each of these examples, the Act provides a right to
copy without payment (like fair use), but subject to elaborate requirements and limitations
(like a compulsory license).
83 See infra note 95.
84 Thus, after being contacted by lawyers representing Edward Weston's estate, appro-
priation artist Sherrie Levine discontinued artistic appropriation of works that might raise
any copyright problem. See supra note 19.
85 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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posed to art. All art, and especially art that reflects back at society86
the contents of the media deluge, is at risk. This section will ex-
amine the dilemma caused by the private ownership of aesthetic
vocabulary and some possible solutions.
A. Copyright and the Suppression of Art
The principal copyright difficulty posed by art is that art some-
times uses (and in the case of appropriation art, always uses), as its
raw material, images-"works"-already in existence. We have pre-
viously examined aesthetic vocabulary and the mass media, to un-
derstand why art must do this. We should remember, however,
that aesthetic justification for artistic appropriation is unnecessary,
whether as a condition of copyright protection or in determining
infringement. In theory, at least, neither copyright nor infringe-
ment may properly be conditioned on a demonstration of aesthetic
merit.87 Nevertheless, many people instinctively react in an unsym-
pathetic way to the works of appropriation artists. Witness, for ex-
ample, the Second Circuit's harsh denunciation of Jeff Koons's
work in its decision in Rogers v. Koons.-"
The copying was so deliberate as to suggest that defendants re-
solved so long as they were significant players in the art business,
and the copies they produced bettered the price of the copied
work by a thousand to one, their piracy of a less well-known art-
ist's work would escape being sullied by an accusation of plagia-
rism .... [I]t is not really the parody flag that appellants are
sailing under, but rather the flag of piracy .... Here there is
simply nothing in the record to support a view that Koons pro-
duced "String of Puppies" for anything other than sale as high-
priced art.8 9
It seems fair to ask whether copyright requires (and if it does,
why it requires) artists to do more than produce works "for sale as
high-priced art." Quite to the contrary, American copyright, with
86 "We claim the right to create with mirrors." Compact disc included in NEGATIVLAND,
supra note 1, at track 10.
87 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52.
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside
of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of
genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make
them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which their
author spoke .... At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures
which appealed to a public less educated than the judge.
Id.
88 960 F.2d 301.
89 Id. at 303, 311, 312.
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costs, both in time and in money, will by necessity avoid using
images that might force them into court. That is to say, they will
abandon their art.9" "Fair use" for these artists means "no use"; it is
merely the illusion of a solution.
Plainly, fair use is not a credible solution to the conflict be-
tween copyright and art.
2. Compulsory Licensing
Like fair use, a compulsory license would permit artists to use
copyrighted works as source material for art; unlike fair use, how-
ever, a compulsory license would require some payment. This
would enable artists to create while protecting the authors of the
copied works by providing some equitable means of payment for
the use of their works. Scholars of copyright, including Professor
Marci Hamilton99 and Judge Pierre Leval, 1°0 have described such a
system.
If it could assure the artist freedom from litigation and threats
of litigation, a compulsory license could overcome the chilling ef-
fect of the fair use doctrine. This will only be the result, however, if
the usual incidents of a compulsory license are reduced to the
point that the arrangement no longer resembles a compulsory li-
cense at all. Thus, a compulsory license is normally conditioned
upon the payment for use of the copied work. Demands for pay-
ment, however, have an obvious chilling effect on the creation of
art. Avoiding this chilling effect requires a payment so small as to
be economically insignificant, which in turn raises the question
whether both society and the respective authors would be better off
without the payment and the associated administrative burden. 1 '
98 Indeed, this has already happened. See supra note 19.
99 Professor Hamilton's "takings model" is not explicitly termed a compulsory license,
although it has all the essential characteristics of a compulsory license. See Hamilton, supra
note 39.
100 See Leval, supra note 63. Judge Leval's proposal, although described in terms of fair
use, involves payment and therefore is closer to a compulsory license than it is to fair use.
One of the chief difficulties of this proposal is Judge Leval's suggestion that the "fair" price
be set by a court. Id. at 1124-25. Because litigation or alternative court proceedings would
be required, it seems inevitable that this proposal would cause the same chilling effect as
the fair use proposals.
101 In addition, payment for use should be linked to damage to the creative incentive.
Thus, payment may be appropriate in the case of mass production and exploitation of a
work (e.g., distribution to the public of a recording of a musical work). Payment, however,
is not called for in the case of art, which does not involve mass exploitation of the copied
work. Similarly, the case for payment becomes stronger when the target market for the
copied work is identical to that for the copying work, as it often is in the normal case
covered by a statutory compulsory license. For example, in most of the cases covered by
section 115 (providing a compulsory license for the "cover" of a musical work by a record-
ing artist once the work has been recorded and distributed to the public), the target mar-
kets-consumers of popular music-are the same for the copied and the copying work. In
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Additionally, a compulsory license is typically applied for and
granted on an individual, case-by-case basis. 112 The application
transaction, however, would unjustifiably inhibit the creation of art
and is therefore inappropriate.
3. Abandoning Copyright
Some commentators have suggested that copyright is rapidly
becoming obsolete, and (responding, perhaps, to the privatization
of aesthetic vocabulary) that copyright as it is now understood
takes insufficient account of collaborative effort and pays inappro-
priate homage to notions of "originality."10 3 This raises the most
radical possibility, at least from the perspective of traditional copy-
right law, namely the abandonment of copyright altogether. This
option has, at least, the virtue of simplicity. If another's legal right
hinders one's own ability to do something, what could be simpler
than taking away the other's right? It would also be effective; if
implemented, it would eliminate any concerns an artist might have
about infringement litigation.
On the other hand, to abandon copyright is unnecessarily
sweeping. While one can debate the merits of copyright in the ab-
stract,104 there is nothing in the cases confronting courts today
(and nothing in art, either) that requires such an extreme ap-
proach. The problem is not that art cannot exist within any copy-
right regime; the problem is that the present copyright regime
treats the artist no differently than the merchandiser.105 Eliminat-
ing copyright to unencumber artists is throwing out the baby with
the bath water. 10 6
III. A PROPOSAL
Each approach discussed so far-fair use, compulsory license,
the case of art, however, the target market is usually different from that for the copied
work.
102 See, e.g.. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115, 118, 119 (1994) (cable transmissions, phonorecords,
public broadcasts, and satellite transmissions); see also Scott L. Bach, Note, Music Recording,
Publishing, and Compulsory Licenses: Toward a Consistent Copyright Law, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV.
379, 385-87 (1986) (discussing history and operation of compulsory licensing).
103 SeeJaszi, supra note 39; Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectiv-
ity, 10 CARDozo ARTs & ENr. LJ. 279 (1992), reprinted in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHOR-
SHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE, supra note 11.
104 A fascinating discussion of copyright from a number of different perspectives ap-
pears in Virtual Reality, Appropriation, and Property Rights in Art: A Roundtable Discussion, supra
note 18.
105 See Marci A. Hamilton, Four Questions About Art, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & Errr. LJ. 119,
119 (1994) (the first question: "Why do we treat art in our legal culture like nonart?").
106 In addition, only some artists would benefit from the elimination of copyright;
others, such as plaintiffs in copyright litigation, obviously would not benefit.
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its relentlessly economic underpinnings, would seem to be com-
pletely fulfilled by the protection ofJeff Koons's work. In any case,
given the purpose of copyright-to enhance public access to
works-there is a certain irony in invoking copyright to stamp out
a genre of art. More importantly, if copyright is invoked to benefit
primarily the authors of the raw material used by artists, rather
than the public, then it is used in a way that is offensive to both art
and the Constitution.9 °
B. Solutions from Within the Copyright Paradigm
The dilemma posed by privately owned aesthetic vocabulary
has not escaped all notice. Legal commentators have proposed so-
lutions, some conventional, some radical. All, however, proceed
from the existing rules and exceptions in the copyright framework.
The following section examines some proposals made to date.
1. Fair Use
We have already seen that the fair use doctrine enables judges
to ensure that public access is preserved, even against colorable
claims of infringement. Because the fair use doctrine represents
an effort to balance the primary and secondary goals of copyright,
it seems at first to be a logical-perhaps even the most obvious-
solution to the problem of private ownership of aesthetic vocabu-
lary.9 1 Fair use has not had much success in protecting art, how-
ever.9" Indeed, fair use in the context of art cannot be of much
value, due to factors that will be considered below.
On the positive side, fair use has the advantage that it does not
require legislative action.93 Fair use is decided on a case-by-case ba-
90 Such a use of copyright is an ever-present danger in a system that seeks to achieve a
primary goal (in this case, benefiting the public) by realizing a secondary goal (here, remu-
nerating authors). Overemphasizing the secondary goal moves the primary goal out of
reach. The same is true of overemphasizing the primary goal: pushing access too hard is
likely to eliminate the author's economic incentive to create works, which in turn reduces
access to works over the long term.
91 See Carlin, supra note 1; cf. Willajeanne F. McLean, All's Not Fair in Art and War: A
Look at the Fair Use Defense After Rogers v. Koons, 59 BROoK- L. REv. 373 (1993).
92 See Rogers, 960 F.2d 301; Ferrato v. Castro, 888 F. Supp. 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (artist not
insulated from future lawsuits by licensees or assignees if collage using copyrighted photo-
graphs was displayed or published in the future); Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque
A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988) (infringement by cutting out pages depicting art,
laminating onto tiles, and selling laminated tiles); Munoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 829
F. Supp. 309 (D. Alaska 1993) (infringement by laminating notecards bearing depictions of
plaintiffs works onto tiles and selling laminated tiles).
93 Congress is unlikely to act quickly under any but the most pressing circumstances,
and "pressing" from the Congressional perspective too often means "advocated forcefully
by a well-funded industry group." Fine artists as a group have never raised a "pressing"
issue under this definition.
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sis by federal judges, and therefore requires action by at most nine
persons to achieve results in any one case. Moreover, fair use is a
matter of established legal doctrine, and thus is an inherently con-
servative approach.
But fair use is not useful for reconciling copyright with art.
This is the case, in part, for the very reasons cited above as virtues,
as well as for other reasons, both theoretical and practical. The fair
use doctrine historically has frowned upon the copying of entire
works. Section 107 of the Act requires a court to consider "the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
[copied] work as a whole."94 Although the language of the statute
does not preclude application of the defense to the copying of en-
tire works, the cases by and large hold otherwise.95 Artists, however,
may need or want to copy an entire work. While perhaps a court or
two could be swayed by the argument that the prohibition on copy-
ing entire works arose in an earlier time, when aesthetic vocabulary
was not the subject of frequent ownership claims, it is unlikely that
the fair use doctrine could be amended to permit copying of entire
works within a reasonable time. In addition, the availability of a
fair use defense increasingly depends upon the defendant convinc-
ing the trial judge that the accused work is "transformative."96
While most works of art probably qualify, at least in the opinion of
the art community, there seems no reason to believe that the fed-
eral bench consistently will agree.
Even more problematic, however, is the fact that fair use is a
judicial, rather than a legislative, solution. This means that its ap-
plicability to the particular work of a particular artist can be estab-
lished only through litigation.97 It is an unfair burden on art to
require appropriation artists to establish the bona fides of their work
each time they are challenged. Artists unable to afford litigation
94 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
95 See, e.g., Weissman v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1325 (2d Cir. 1989); Walt Disney
Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th
Cir. 1956), affd &y an equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d
1171 (9th Cir. 1983); see McLean, supra note 91. See generally 3 MELVILLE B. AND DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPMRGHT § 13.05D (1996). But see Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
96 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
97 Fair use is "an intricate and embarrassing question ... [it is not] easy to arrive at any
satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down any general principles applicable to all cases." Fol-
som v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J.). Compare Loew's, Inc. v. CBS,
131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), affd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (Jack
Benny parody of Gaslight not a fair use), with Columbia Pictures Corp. v. NBC, 137 F. Supp.
348 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (NBC parody of From Here to Eternity ("From Here to Obscurity") a fair
use). See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679
("[N]o generally applicable definition [of fair use] is possible, and each case raising the
question must be decided on its own facts.").
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and abandoning copyright-has certain advantages. Nevertheless,
each also has drawbacks making it unsuitable as a solution to the
problems raised by the private ownership of aesthetic vocabulary.
The traditional tools of copyright are ineffective for this purpose.
If art will be preserved despite the private ownership of contempo-
rary aesthetic vocabulary, alternatives to these conventional tools
must be deployed.
A. Description
A solution may be achieved by discarding those portions of the
fair use doctrine and the compulsory license that cause the disad-
vantages discussed above. The result of this approach would be a
copyright privilege: no payment or negotiation would be required
(for these would unacceptably inhibit the creation of art), but the
privilege would protect an artist only if the art posed no competi-
tive threat to the copied work. Stated in terms of the exceptions to
authorial exclusivity described above, the proposal is to regulate
artistic appropriation in a hybrid manner: no payment, and no ap-
plication, would be required; but the use made of the copied work
would be carefully circumscribed. In terms of copyright's purpose,
the point of the privilege is to permit enough access to aesthetic
vocabulary so that it can be used as raw material for art, but not so
much as to significantly diminish copyright's economic incentive to
create.
When does a work of art pose no competitive threat to the
copied work? In general, works of "fine art" pose no competitive
threat to copied works. The fine art market is highly specialized,
and is one in which copying is quite common: "reproductions" are,
after all, copies of works. Remaining to be addressed, however, is
the definition of "fine art." This must be done with sufficient cer-
tainty to make clear what works are within the privilege, and to
reduce substantially the likelihood-and thus, the chilling effect-
of infringement litigation. In sum, we seek a definition that (i) will
ensure that the work of fine art will not compete with its own raw
material in the marketplace (in other words, that will not damage
the economic incentive to create) and (ii) will be sufficiently pre-
dictable to avoid the chilling effect resulting from the need to de-
cide every case on its merits.
While the task of defining fine art may seem daunting, it is a
task that Congress has already undertaken, when it adopted the
1997J
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Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 ("VARA").107 Under VARA, artists
have rights additional to those ordinarily included in American
copyright, but only in certain kinds of works. Congress wanted to
be sure that only "art" in the sense of "fine art" would benefit from
these additional rights. Accordingly, VARA applies only to "works
of visual art," defined as:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single
copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed
and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a
sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of
200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and
bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes
only, existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in
a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and con-
secutively numbered by the author.
A work of visual art does not include-
(A) (i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing,
diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other au-
diovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical,
data base, electronic information service, electronic pub-
lication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promo-
tional, descriptive, covering, or packaging material or
container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in
clause (i) or (ii); or
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under
this title.108
This definition will serve quite well to draw the line between
works that might threaten the market for copied works, and works
that pose no competitive threat. While it is possible to produce
bad art (and non-art) in 200 or fewer copies, the small number of
copies ensures that the economic incentive to create will not be
diminished. This is so for at least two reasons: first, 200 copies of
anything is insignificant, compared with the number needed even
to dent the media audience. Second, and especially in cases where
the copied work did not originate in the media (if it is a "work of
visual art," for example), the audience for limited-edition art is dis-
107 Pub. L. No. 101-650, Tit. VI, § 603(a), 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 106A, and scattered additional sections of 17 U.S.C. (1994)).
108 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definition of "work of visual art").
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cerning. Such art is purchased by collectors who are, for the most
part, knowledgeable about the works they buy; they are unlikely to
mistake, for example, the Sherrie Levine photograph After Ansel
Adams for a photograph by Ansel Adams himself.1 °9 They can be
expected to know the difference between the copied and the copy-
ing works. Furthermore, the proposed copyright privilege would
not affect the law of fraud; to copy a work and pass it off as the
original would be forgery, and would be no less criminal (or ac-
tionable in tort) for all that it would not violate copyright.
Finally, while it is conceivable that a "pirate" would copy well-
known works in editions of less than 200, thereby escaping copy-
right liability, this would not be an economically attractive course
of conduct. A completely untransformative use of another's work
would not excite much interest among art collectors or artists. Of
course, the "pirate" could claim "transformation," but the art world
would be under no obligation to believe her. And if such limited
editions could not be sold profitably in the market for fine art, they
would not be economically attractive, because there would not be
enough copies to permit mass marketing of the editions.
It is thus highly unlikely that copies made pursuant to the pro-
posed privilege would substitute for the copied work. Indeed, even
the most blatant copying-in appropriation art-would be ex-
tremely unlikely to damage in any appreciable way the market for
the copied work. In the cases brought against appropriation artist
Jeff Koons, for example, the plaintiffs did not argue that Koons's
work substituted for their own in the market. Indeed, they could
not: a person seeking to send a postcard would not buy a sculpture
instead.
Of course, a plaintiff might argue that even if no actual market
was damaged, a potential market was affected. 10 But such claims
would not withstand even a cursory inspection. For example, sup-
pose the plaintiff in Rogers v. Koons claimed harm to the market
that would have arisen had he decided to make his own sculptures
based on his postcard. Does anyone suppose that the art world
would have treated the plaintiffs sculptures as equivalent to those
of Koons? Certainly not; at least one feature making Koons's work
desirable is that it is by Koons. Even when the copying work is
virtually identical to the copied work, the art market is well
equipped to distinguish between them. In cases where the copying
109 Nor, it might be added, are they likely to mistake a sculpture by Jeff Koons for a
postcard by Art Rogers.
110 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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and copied works are not identical, distinguishing between the
works is even easier (and is even less likely to damage copyright's
economic incentive to create). The art world is used to being
faced with two works that appear identical; it does not treat such
works as interchangeable.
Thus, artists could, without damaging copyright's economic
incentive to create, be privileged to copy the copyrighted works of
others, as long as the exercise of the privilege results in "works of
visual art" as defined in VARA. Artists (and ultimately the public)
would benefit from the resulting increase in the raw materials avail-
able for the production of art, and the owners of copyright in the
raw materials would not be damaged. The privilege should extend
to any copyrighted materials, used in any manner and for any pur-
pose, provided that the result is a work of visual art. The privilege
need not extend to any other use, either for the author of the vis-
ual artwork or for anyone else. If the visual artwork were to lose its
status as a "work of visual art" (for example, because it is repro-
duced in more than 200 copies), then the privilege likewise would
be lost."'
B. Policy
The VARA definition of "work of visual art" thus meets all of
our requirements: it is a bright-line test, requiring for its applica-
tion little more than the ability to count to 200. It leaves intact
copyright's economic incentive to create. It increases public access
to works of authorship, and it frees artists from the difficulties of
communication with an aesthetic vocabulary that is private prop-
erty. These benefits alone are probably enough justification for
the privilege, but they are not the only benefits.1 2 The privilege
111 Such a scenario would probably constitute copyright infringement, although fair use
would remain available as a defense.
112 One might, of course, object that this proposal not only deprives the copied author
of control over the use of her work, but does so based upon the idea that the copying
works are "art," in what some would probably construe as an elitist sense. Judge Leisure
warned:
The fact that the infringing copy can be classified as "art" or as being part of an
"artistic tradition" cannot be used as a shield to salvage an otherwise defective
fair use defense .... If the subjective classification of an otherwise infringing
work as "art" automatically immunized such work under the fair use doctrine,
the doctrine would virtually eviscerate the protection afforded by the Copyright
Act.
United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. at 379. Judge Leisure, however, was
concerned about an improper broadening of the fair use doctrine, to neutralize claims of
infringement by a work that a federal judge believes is "art." The crux of the objection lay
in "the subjective classification of an infringing work as 'art'" (emphasis added). From
Judge Leisure's perspective, the danger is that the subjectivity of such a fair use exception
would swallow up the copyright rule. This danger is effectively eliminated from the cur-
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will also substantially reduce the number of copyright disputes in
this troublesome area. Because the VARA definition of "work of
visual art" is reasonably clear, relatively few disputes over whether a
work is a privileged work may be expected. Obviously the VARA
test is far more certain in its application than is the fair use
doctrine.
C. Technical Issues
Congress promulgated the definition of "work of visual art" to
limit the applicability of VARA's moral rights, not to limit a copy-
right privilege. Changes to the language of the definition are
therefore necessary to make the privilege function exactly as in-
tended. Two changes are most important; each relates to an exclu-
sion from the statutory definition of "work of visual art." The first
deals with the exclusion of all works for hire from "works of visual
art." The propriety of this exclusion has been in question from its
very beginning, even for the originally intended application of the
definition."1 It is unclear why works for hire do not qualify as
"works of visual art." There is no reason to exclude them, and they
should therefore qualify both for purposes of the artist's privilege
and for the moral rights protection provided by VARA.
A second exclusion from the VARA definition causes another
problem: VARA excludes "any work not subject to copyright pro-
tection under this title." That is, VARA provides that a work that is
uncopyrightable is excluded from the definition of "work of visual
art." But suppose an artist exercises the privilege to copy: is the
resulting work copyrightable? Perhaps, but only if it does not in-
fringe the copied work. Yet, of course, it very likely does infringe
the copied work-unless it is within the privilege. In other words,
the exclusion confronts us with a "chicken-and-egg" problem: the
work is not within the privilege unless it is copyrightable, but it is
not copyrightable unless it is within the privilege. Fortunately, this,
too, is easily solved, by expanding the category of privileged works
to include all those satisfying the definition of "work of visual art,"
and copyrightable but for the fact that they copy another work.
rent proposal by the utilization of the VARA definition of "work of visual art," which, be-
cause it relies on an objective standard (i.e., the number of copies), poses no similar
danger to the authors of copied works.
113 See Marci A. Hamilton, Commissioned Works As Works Made for Hire Under the 1976 Copy-
tight Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. R'v. 1281 (1987); Roy S. Kaufman, The
Berne Convention and American Protection of Artists' Moral Rights: Requirements, Limits and Mis-
conceptions, 15 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARts 417 (1991); see also EdwardJ. Damich, Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990: Toward a System of Moral Rights Protection for Vtsual Art, 39 CAmH. U. L. REV.
945 (1990).
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This, however, does not yet solve all our technical problems.
There remains the question of the rights of an artist who has cre-
ated a work in reliance on the privilege against a person who cop-
ies the resulting work of visual art. What if someone were to copy
such a copyright-exempt work and merchandise it in T-shirts and
other goods not themselves within the artist's privilege? Would the
artist have a cause of action against such a person? If so, as intui-
tion might at first suggest, wouldn't the artist (because of the Feist
constitutional requirement) have to establish "originality" to the
satisfaction of a court?
A copying artist seeking to enforce her copyright (if one exists)
would indeed have to establish originality. For most artists, how-
ever, this will never be a problem; the originality of their work is
evident. In the extreme case of appropriation art merchandised by
an unauthorized third party, the owner of copyright in the copied
work would have a cause of action for infringement: the unauthor-
ized copy of the appropriation art would also be a copy of the ap-
propriated work, which copy (unlike the appropriation art) would
not have the benefit of a statutory exemption. Perhaps for the
time being, this is all that can be achieved.
CONCLUSION
Artists depend upon the availability of aesthetic vocabulary to
communicate with their audiences. Without access to aesthetic vo-
cabulary, art cannot flourish and, ultimately, public access to works
of authorship declines. Mass communication technologies, how-
ever, have increasingly made proprietary the images of aesthetic
vocabulary. Copyright, which aims at increasing public access to
works of authorship, must respond to this increasing proprietiza-
tion of aesthetic vocabulary by privileging artists to use copyrighted
materials without fear of litigation. As long as the works privileged
are within the VARA definition of "works of visual art," such a privi-
lege will support both the primary and the secondary goals of
copyright.
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